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Deweyan Tools for inquiry and the Epistemological Context of Critical Pedagogy 
 
 
Resistance to social justice education has been attributed to a number of sources: the desire to 
uphold privilege, a willing ignorance to face social facts, an unawareness of history, or a 
psychological defense to shame and guilt (Willingham 2010; McFadden 1995; Pitt 1998; Weitz 
2001; Lather 1992; Giroux 2001). Another possibility, taken up recently by Barbara Applebaum 
(2007), is that students resist the framing of problems in social justice terms, viewing them 
instead through other interpretive lenses. Rather than seeing resistance to social justice-focused 
classroom inquiry as mere interpretive disagreement, however, Applebaum considers it an 
epistemological problem, arguing that it entails a fundamental refusal to use the conceptual 
resources offered for examination. She characterizes it as a “premature disengagement” (p. 337) 
that exhibits both an individual refusal to confront the personal implications of evidence of 
privilege and oppression and a larger “culturally sponsored defensiveness” (p. 339). Social 
justice educators, she argues, should intervene because the refusal to engage is both “offensive to 
the systemically marginalized” (p. 339) and contributes to the reproduction of oppressive social 
systems. By Applebaum’s analysis, resistance to social justice education consists of at least two 
mutually reinforcing dynamics: students’ refusal to think with new conceptual resources and their 
persistent use of ones that support oppression. These are clear obstacles to social justice 
education, which, crucially, depends on the development of adequate conceptual tools for 
understanding and working against oppression. 
There is danger in identifying and focusing upon student resistance to social justice 
education, however: it can be tempting to blame students because they do not “engage properly” 
with social justice inquiry (Lindquist 1994; Colby 2006).  As Lindquist argues, discussions of 
resistance often imply “some kind of inadequacy in the person labeled resistant; for example, a 
Page 1 of 28






























































For Peer Review Only
Deweyan Tools for inquiry 2 
failure to understand her/his motives and actions, a lack of knowledge, or a refusal to 
acknowledge information in a given situation” (Lindquist 1994, 3). Describing student rejection 
of social justice inquiry as “resistance,” then, risks pathologizing student thinking, especially 
when it is characterized as deficit. So while Applebaum rightly captures an important 
epistemological dimension of social justice education, the specter of paternalism may be close at 
hand when casting students as ‘resistant’ to what educators are endeavoring to teach. Moreover, 
assigning the name ‘resistance’ psychologizes and personalizes what may equally be regarded as 
a structural problem in a social justice framework. One challenge facing critical educators, 
therefore, is to develop an epistemological position that helps reconcile the social and personal 
dimensions of so-called ‘resistanc ,’ while also pointing to practical ways forward. 
In this article, we extend Applebaum’s emphasis on epistemology by further developing the 
notion of resistance as both ‘culturally sponsored’ and cognitively manifested. We try and avoid 
paternalism and pathologizing by incorporating John Dewey’s conception of tools for inquiry 
into the discussion of critical pedagogy. Dewey provides a way to conceptualize student 
resistance not as a form of willful disputation, but instead as a function of socialization into 
cultural models of thought that actively truncate inquiry. In other words, ‘resistance’ can be 
construed as the cognitive and emotive dimensions of the ongoing failure of institutions to 
provide ideas that help individuals both recognize social problems and imagine possible 
solutions. Focusing on Dewey’s epistemological framework, specifically tools for inquiry, 
provides a way to grasp this problem. It also affords some innovative solutions; for instance, it 
helps conceive of possible links between the “regular” curriculum and the study of specific social 
justice issues, a relationship that is often under-examined. The aims of critical pedagogy depend 
upon students developing dexterity with the conceptual tools they use to make meaning of the 
evidence they confront; these are background skills that the regular curriculum can be made to 
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serve even outside social justice-focused curricula. Furthermore, because such inquiry involves 
the exploration and potential revision of students’ world-ordering beliefs, developing flexibility 
in how one thinks may be better achieved within academic subjects and topics that are not so 
intimately connected to students’ current social lives, especially where students may be directly 
implicated.  
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we discuss Dewey’s epistemology, 
focusing on conceptual “tools for inquiry” and articulate their relationship to resistance. In the 
second, we argue that the context surrounding social justice education has important implications 
for student resistance. We ground the argument within two general school practices, high stakes 
testing and academic tracking. In the third section, we argue that analyzing how conceptual tools 
influence the ways meaning is made within the general curriculum can support the more specific 
aims of social justice education by developing a kind of “epistemological dexterity.” This helps 
reframe ‘resistance’ to social justice education. We conclude by proposing a next step, 
integrating discipline-specific engagement with Deweyan inquiry tools and social justice topics. 
Tools for inquiry 
In How We Think (1933), Dewey recounts a young Charles Darwin’s encounter with the 
power of conceptual thought after finding a tropical shell in a gravel pit. Excited by the 
discovery of a geologic anomaly, Darwin brings the shell to his Cambridge teacher, the geologist 
Adam Sedgwick. Sedgwick is not impressed. If the shell had been deposited naturally, his 
teacher asserts, “it would be the greatest misfortune to geology, because it would overthrow all 
that we know about the superficial deposits of the Midland Counties” (Darwin, quoted in Dewey 
1933, 153). Dewey uses the story to illustrate that scientific inquiry depends upon the use of a 
relatively stable set of conceptual tools to guide its investigation. If the shell were revealed to be 
anything other than a haphazard transplant, Sedgwick would have to alter his fundamental 
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understandings of geology. He would now have to doubt what had been previously useful and 
relatively stable geologic concepts. Doing so could render him unable to pursue scientific inquiry 
with any confidence. His resistance, his distinct lack of enthusiasm for Charles’ find, is 
understandable. 
We propose that social justice education places students in Sedgwick-like positions. 
Engaging with the substance of social justice education, through examining the metaphorical 
tropical shells offered by teachers, may require students to doubt and even revise the beliefs and 
concepts they use to make sense of their social worlds. Like the geologist who depends upon 
relatively stable sets of scientific concepts in order to guide ongoing investigation, they are 
similarly invested in the continued use of concepts that have successfully guided their personal 
meaning making in previous instances.
1
 Within the context of critical pedagogy, these include 
the ways race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality or social class do or do not impact their lives. Many 
students, for example, come to the classroom with solidified concepts of what sexism means and 
whether or not it has an influence on their social experiences. Through their experiences, they 
have developed relatively stable conceptual tools that help them effortlessly to ‘do’ gender and 
make meaning of it according to prevailing cultural models (see West and Zimmerman 1987). 
When teachers offer evidence for the influence of sexism in their lives, students may resist by 
rejecting it, like Sedgwick’s reaction to the tropical shell, because acceptance would require that 
they doubt the conceptual resources that have previously helped them explain their interactions 
as devoid of gender implications. Here we see one of the key aims of critical pedagogy is 
foregrounded: to help students question the beliefs they already successfully use to make 
meaning of social justice issues. Or, in terms of our argument, such education aims to help 
                                                 
1
 By “meaning making” we do not mean to imply that we “make up” meanings. Instead, we use 
the language to emphasize the active nature of personal inquiry. 
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students transform the way they hold such beliefs – from being relatively stable and 
unquestioned to more tentatively held and subject to revision. 
The shell example also points to the utility of Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology for thinking 
about and working with conceptual tools related to social justice issues as well as resistance to 
their study. Tracing the Hegelian influences on Dewey’s epistemology, Jim Garrison argues that 
Dewey’s action-oriented epistemology involves labor as we attempt to answer questions or to 
restore harmony in situations of doubt. All inquiry begins in doubt, and that “doubt is a living, 
embodied, and impassioned condition, a state of need and active seeking” (Garrison 1997, 94). 
Dewey is helpful here: “living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of disequlibrations and 
recoveries of equilibrium… The state of disturbed equilibrium constitutes need. The movement 
towards its restoration is search and exploration. The recovery is fulfillment or satisfaction” 
(Dewey quoted in Garrison 1997, 92). Inquiry involves action – labor – and as such, we require 
resources – or tools – to do our mental work. Moreover, inquiry-related actions (which 
necessarily involve tools) are focused upon the resolution of doubt or confusion, what Dewey 
and Garrison describe as the restoration of harmony. Tools, then, are an important part of the 
inquiry process because they help perform the task of restoring harmony; they are essential to 
doing the labor of inquiry. “Work, labor and tools, justify themselves by satisfying our needs and 
bringing about the desired object and its enjoyment” (Garrison 1995, 96). This is linked to 
Dewey’s rejection of a correspondence or “spectator” theory of truth. He instead argues for 
“warranted assertions,” moving away from a static conception of knowledge and onto the 
ongoing and active nature of “knowing” which is irreducible to something outside the process of 
inquiry.  Knowing, then, is grounded and contextualized in our social lives and daily experiences 
and is indissoluble from the very tools we use to inquire.  
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Varieties of tools.  In How We Think (1933), Dewey divides tools for inquiry into three types: 
beliefs, meanings and concepts. It is helpful for our purposes to read the list as a progression 
from relatively unfixed to more fixed. A belief is a tentatively used tool, one that we might use to 
guide inquiry, but with less confidence in its ability to help resolve doubt. Because a belief is an 
untested and an unreliable resource, Dewey asserts that, “we hold it in suspense as a possibility 
rather than accept it as an actuality” (Dewey 1933, 132). Seen in this way, ideas become “tools 
with which to search for material to solve a problem” (Dewey 1933, 133). It is important to note 
Dewey’s insistence that even when held tentatively, using ideas is itself a transactional process.  
Through use, the tool, the person, and the object of inquiry are all altered. Like a hand 
conforming to the grip of a hamm r in order to drive a nail, user, tool, and problem merge into a 
singular act whereby “meaning is extended as well as defined” (Dewey 1933, 157). And, like 
material tools, ideas gain use value by accumulating successes at problem solving. When 
meanings are further refined through their successful use during inquiry, they become relatively 
solidified as concepts.  
In this way, concepts are ideas that have performed reliably in prior inquiry (Dewey 1933, 
149). Dewey wrote: 
An idea, after it has been used as a guide to observation and action, may be 
confirmed and so acquire an accepted status on its own behalf. Afterwards it is 
employed, not tentatively and conditionally, but with assurance as an 
instrumentality of understanding and explaining things that are still uncertain and 
perplexing. These established meanings, taken to be secure and warranted, are 
conceptions. (Dewey 1933, 149) 
 
To exemplify his point, Dewey points to common nouns like “table, stone, sunset, grass, animal, 
moon, and on through the list of common nouns that are solid and dependable” (Dewey 1933, 
150). In keeping with the linguist’s maxim that language is arbitrary, he argues that these nouns 
have become concepts—their significance in our world is virtually settled. The key here is that 
we base further inquiry upon these concepts; we use them to make meaning in the face of 
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perplexing new situations. Just as it would be absurd to puzzle over the mass of a hammer each 
time one picks it up—gripping happens effortlessly after only a few uses—concepts “introduce 
solidity into what would otherwise be formless, and permanence into what would otherwise be 
shifting” (Dewey 1933, 150 emphasis in original). Furthermore, the “concept signifies that a 
meaning has been stabilized and remains the same in different contexts” (Dewey 1933, 151). As 
such, concepts are essential for continued inquiry: “The moment a meaning is gained, it is a 
working tool of further apprehensions, an instrument of understanding other things” (Dewey 
1933, 157). In this way, as tools for inquiry, concepts help make meaning in a variety of 
contexts, especially in novel ones that require dependable resources with which to build new 
understandings.  
How tools function.  Specific tools—like our trusty hammer—enable us to make certain 
moves and not others. In other words, they foreclose as well as enable active processes of inquiry 
in our everyday situations, but when we bring tried-and-true resources into new situations, they 
may not work well to resolve doubt. For example, within the context of critical pedagogy, our 
accumulated conceptual tools that have helped us make meaning in a sexist world may not be 
able to account for new evidence that sexism exists in ways that we previously failed to 
recognize. Perhaps a belief in the meritocratic nature of schooling may help middle class, white 
males arrive at meanings they find satisfying: Work hard and you shall be rewarded. Those who 
fail are lazy. Such beliefs may be tentatively held at first, but continued experiences in school 
tend to confirm these beliefs credibly explain differences in academic performance. They thus 
move from tentatively held guiding tools to trusted ones. Again, it is useful to recall the bi-
directional nature of tools, making the user conform to their features. Dewey elaborates: 
We cannot explain why we believe the things which we most firmly hold to 
because those things are a part of ourselves. We can no more completely escape 
them when we try to examine into them than we can get outside our physical 
skins so as to view them from without. Call these regulative traditions 
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apperceptive organs or mental habits or whatever you will, there is no thinking 
without them. (Dewey 1985, 13) 
 
Like Sedgwick’s reaction to Darwin’s shell, accepting the evidence that one’s academic success 
may be partially a result of gender privilege may require male students not only to question the 
nature of their gendered social experiences, but also the stable conceptual tools they have used to 
make sense of their social worlds. Such beliefs may fail to account for evidence that social 
positions provide some with privileges that help them succeed in ways that may be unjust. Tools 
for thinking are implicated in both the problems concerning critical educators and their possible 
solutions. 
Context and the Tools for inquiry 
Context matters. Individual classroom explorations – attempts to create spaces where 
students are encouraged to upend stable concepts in favor of less sturdy ones – exist within an 
expansive architecture to which children have been socialized, which exists before, during and 
after the particular situation at hand. While old ways of resolving problems may be disrupted in 
situ, students are also continuously re-engaging with the same topics in other contexts that may 
support their continued use and cultivation in ways we may wish to question and problematize. 
As such, change is particularly difficult, tied as it is to an on-going series of highly personal, 
everyday acts of inquiring, of which the social justice classroom is but one type and location. 
Dewey’s conception of tools for inquiry suggests the need for an “epistemological dexterity” – 
the ability to hold even one’s most dependable concepts tentatively, as if they were beliefs.
2
 Such 
work is, of course, both complex and difficult. We are not implying that epistemological 
                                                 
2
 By focusing on what he describes as “world views” Richard Paul uses a much broader 
categorization than we are describing here, but his arguments about both the incredible difficulty 
and the importance of subjecting one’s most fundamental and solidly held (unquestioned) 
concepts are right on target. See Paul’s (1984) Critical Thinking: Fundamental to Education for 
a Free Society. 
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dexterity itself will lead to a necessary acceptance of social justice aims or arguments; it may, 
however, increase the likelihood that concepts that underwrite social oppression will become 
questioned.
3
   
Focusing on the context of the emergence and use of tools for inquiry – especially with 
regard to social justice focused education – is important because conceptual tools are learned and 
used in multiple contexts, providing them with varied transactional venues for solidification. 
Understanding the larger context is important because it may offer additional resources for 
helping students to engage with these multiple social contexts in critical ways, thereby more 
directly exploring how they utilize their meaning-making resources in multiple spaces. Again, it 
is important to emphasize that a tool of inquiry gains usefulness when it helps solve problems, 
but it does so within an important epistemological background of other, corroborating conceptual 
resources. This entails considering a concept in its relation to other things: “to note how it 
operates or functions, what consequences follow from it, what causes it, what uses it can be put 
to” (Dewey 1933, 137-138). What Dewey means here is perhaps clearest within his discussion of 
language use and context: To converse successfully with others, we must rely upon a background 
filled with inquiry related tools like grammar, syntax and vocabulary: 
a vast network of relations surrounds the individual: indeed, ‘surrounds’ is too 
external a word, since every individual lives in the network and as a part of it. The 
material of personal reflection and of choice comes to each of us from the 
customs, traditions, institutions, policies, and plans of these large collective 
wholes. (Dewey and Tufts 1909, 370)  
 
Dewey also argues: “we are not explicitly aware of the role of context just because our every 
utterance is so saturated with it that it forms the significance of what we say and hear” (Dewey 
                                                 
3
 We agree with one anonymous reviewer of this paper who stated the point well: “While a 
greater epistemological awareness by itself is not a simple logical guarantee that one will 
overturn previous conceptions, it greatly increases the chances for cognitive and emotional 
confrontations that call for a better resolution.”  
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1985, 4). He goes on to state that “what is true of the meaning of words and sentences is true of 
all meaning” (Dewey 1985, 4).
4
 Many tools for inquiry may be so stable and implicit in the 
background of our thinking that we may fail to recognize them while we continue to use them in 
current projects that simultaneously solidify their use values. In this way, users ‘collude’ with the 
tools they use in ordinary interactions, and in so doing, become certain types of people (see 
Wortham 2005). Dewey argues that such background thinking resources only become apparent 
when “responsible for some of the confusion and perplexity we are trying to clear up” (Dewey 
1985, 11-12). We notice their existence when they fail to resolve doubts or solve the problems 
that motivate inquiry.  
Furthermore, meaning-making tools function in specific locations to solve specific sorts of 
problems and not others. They help us resolve confusion and doubts, to make meaning in 
response to particular configurations of social relations and practices that structure our 
interactions in specific ways. Schools are one such location, requiring unique inquiry tools to 
resolve the types of problems that emerge within them (see Cazden 2001; Minick 1993). As a 
result, students may develop school-related tools for inquiry that work within one context – the 
school – but (similar to category mistakes) we can misapply them to other social contexts. 
Likewise, schools may contribute to flawed or partial concepts based upon inadequate 
understandings of the social and political dynamics that shape them. In the following section, we 
use two school examples—high stakes testing and tracking—to show how contextual 
background affects the ways tools for inquiry arise and are used. 
Mandatory curricular goals and high stakes tests designed to insure that those goals are met 
in specific ways form the background in which teachers and students develop and then use tools 
                                                 
4
 Dewey describes language as the “tool of tools” because it instrumentally enables us to craft 
any other sort of tool. Garrison elaborates in his (1995) Dewey’s Philosophy and Theory of 
Working. See also Dewey’s Experience and Nature (1925/2000). 
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for inquiry, often with implications for understanding student intelligence and motivation 
(Crocco and Costigan 2007). The tools students develop may seemingly resolve questions about 
ability and interest, but lead to mistaken conclusions. Teachers and students then incorrectly use 
such judgments as new tools to form general beliefs about students’ aptitudes and motivations 
elsewhere in their lives. Such incorrect judgments emerge from a much broader context where 
schools have responded to accountability measures and testing pressures to narrow the 
curriculum while increasing the prescription of both content and pedagogy (Crocco and Costigan 
2007). For instance, while many elementary school teachers are spending more time on literacy 
instruction, they may be required to follow prescriptive “pacing guides” that mandate content 
and instructional strategies therefore limiting the ranges of literacy experiences students receive 
to textual decoding and test preparation (Crocco and Costigan 2007, 516).
 
  High school teachers 
fare no better, for while they may not use the same formulaic curricular materials (although text-
books can certainly be used in that way), their subject-area mandates are so packed with content-
specifics that many teachers limit their primary instructional strategies to lectures, drills and 
tests, with no space for innovation or student engagement, let alone critical analysis (Crocco and 
Costigan 2007). As teachers across the country know too well, it results in a narrowed 
curriculum that focuses on testing to claim legitimacy by aligning itself at least rhetorically  “to 
scientific and positivistic forms of knowing” (Barnett 1993, 35). Boldt, Salvio and Taubman 
(2009) argue that this “has impoverished the intellectual, aesthetic, and affective dimensions of 
life in classrooms. Students’ interests, curiosity, and play, as well as teachers’ passions and 
questions fall by the wayside as they work together to follow directives and meet production 
quotas” (p. 3). 
While such prescriptiveness is troubling in general, it constitutes the context in which 
specific inquiry tools help understand students as learners. For example, Diane Reay’s (2001) 
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research into “high stakes” tests in British elementary schools illustrates that the scores used to 
assess students may also provide them with tools that they can use for thinking about themselves 
in ways we fail to understand. Tracey, a year six student Reay describes, expresses nervousness 
at her prospects for doing well on the Stage 2 Standard Achievement Test (SAT) despite the 
constant drilling her teachers and peers have done in preparation for the test. She states: “I’m 
frightened I’ll do the SATs and I’ll be a nothing” (Reay 2001, 342). When pressed by the 
interviewer about her statement, Tracey replied that she meant what she said. “You have to get a 
level like a level 4 or a level 5 and if you’re no good at spellings and times tables you don’t get 
those levels and so you’re a nothing” (Reay 2001, 342).
5
 Another student equated the scores with 
moral virtue and future life chanc s. Imagining the prospect of a low score, she remarked, “I 
might not have a good life in front of me and I might grow up and do something naughty or 
something like that” (Reay 2001, 342). Reay reports that  
When later in the year I interviewed Tracey, now in year 7 of an inner city 
predominantly working class comprehensive she told me, unsolicited, that she 
was a 3, 3, 3. When I asked her how she felt about that, she replied that it was 
better than being a nothing, but still “rubbish.” (Reay 2001, 343) 
 
Reay’s transcripts speak powerfully of the influence of educational practices upon student self-
conceptions. As a tool of inquiry in her personalized meaning making, the exam helps Tracey 
understand herself as a “3,” as “rubbish.”  
In this instance, the test score has become a tool of further inquiry. If we return to Dewey’s 
original semantic differences, what Reay describes here exemplifies a belief becoming a 
meaning. When Tracey began her experience with the high stakes examination, she was already 
using the notion of the test score to understand herself and her potential future, a future that was 
conceptually limited because of what her teachers communicated low test scores represent. After 
                                                 
5
 Note that the expected, or “normal,” score for the tests is a 4. 
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taking the test and receiving a low score, Tracey’s meaning making seems to become more 
solidified around her intelligence and potential future path. The tentative language is gone. She 
identifies with her low score. But tools for inquiry are also transactional; Tracey’s belief further 
creates the reality that she is not intelligent and motivated: rubbish. As Dewey tells us, “beliefs, 
made in reality, reciprocate by making reality still farther, by developing it” (Dewey 1906, 114). 
The test, originally designed as a tool for understanding some aspect of a student’s learning, 
seems to have become a tool that the student uses to understand herself in other, unrelated 
contexts. We also know that others may also use test results as tools for identifying Tracey as 
well – further colluding in the solidification of this tool for thinking. 
Tracey’s use of the test as tool in other areas of inquiry is a violation of what Dewey 
describes as the Unlimited Universalism Fallacy (Dewey 1985; Garrison 1997). When judgments 
about students’ intelligence, interests in learning, and even moral natures are universalized and 
disconnected from the contextual frameworks (i.e., school practices) in which they emerge, 
educators and others—parents, policymakers, prospective employers—are guilty of using tools 
for inquiry in contexts and to solve problems in ways that are unwarranted. Dewey reminds us 
that, “when context is taken into account, it is seen that every generalization occurs under 
limiting conditions set by the contextual situation” (Dewey quoted in Garrison 1997, 113, 
emphasis added). Similarly, Garrison (1997) argues that using inquiry tools in this way helps 
educators become “blinded from seeing students’ strengths and potential” through using 
“superficial and decontextualized instruments and means used to measure intelligence and 
ability” (Garrison 1997, 186). Here again arises the need to focus on the context of inquiry – 
specifically upon the background conditions of schooling which ‘culturally sponsors’ casting 
students in particular ways. Tools for inquiry emerge as successful resources for making 
meaning in the school context, and in so doing they move from beliefs to potential concepts.  
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High stakes test scores is but one example of an inquiry tool that arises and is potentially 
solidified in the specific context of schooling, but there are other tools and contexts to consider. 
For example, the routine practice of academic tracking may also inspire the development of 
inquiry tools that subvert the aims of critical pedagogy and aid student resistance to justice-
focused inquiry. Tracking advocates argue that it is a merit-based scheme whereby students are 
divided by their natural abilities and interests into differentiated instructional courses (Ansalone 
2001; Oakes 1987, 1990). Because academically tracked class assignments are reportedly 
developed using a variety of factors—students’ prior academic records, test-measured abilities, 
their career aspirations—tracking proponents argue that it is both an efficient and beneficent 
sorting mechanism. But like test scores in the last example, because they are not contextualized, 
academic tracking may inspire the development of tools for inquiry that help both students and 
teachers understand students’ primary motivations and intellectual capacities in damagingly 
inaccurate ways.  
For example, while academic counselors often consult students’ past records to determine 
track placement (Oakes et al. 1992; Mehan et al. 1996; Ball 2003), students of color and lower 
socio-economic classes disproportionately populate non-academic, vocational, and lower tracks 
(Oakes et al. 1992).
 
 Similarly, girls are frequently tracked into academic courses that prepare 
them for caring and administrative support positions (Oakes 1987, 1990; Plummer 2000).
 
Consider also the research focused on the “self fulfilling prophecy” of tracking placement with 
regard to racial and social class identities. As a number of early research studies demonstrate 
(Persell 1977; Dornbusch, Glasgow, and Lin 1996), track placement may influence teacher 
perceptions of student abilities in powerful ways, forming a “self fulfilling prophecy” of tracking 
placement with regard to racial and social class identities. Teachers of lower tracked classes 
considered their students to be  “unresponsive” and less intelligent, while they deemed their 
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higher-tracked students to be quite bright. This had practical consequences: “Videotaped 
interactions revealed that teachers spent more time attending to students who were randomly 
labeled as having greater academic ability than to students randomly labeled as having less 
ability” (Dornbusch, Glasgow, and Lin 1996, 410; see also San Antonio 2004, 149). A study by 
Ellen Brantlinger gives language to this: one interviewed teacher considered the college tracked 
students to be the “best,” the “brightest” or the “good kids,” while the others are “troubled” and 
“less interested in school”(Brantlinger 2003). It is not surprising that research also indicates that 
students in such tracked classes develop beliefs about themselves as students (i.e., aspects like 
intellectual capacities and motivation to pursue schooling) that mirror those expressed by their 
teachers (Gamoran and Berends 1987; Reay 2001; San Antonio 2004). While this arrangement 
can be read as evidence of social reproduction (Gamoran and Berends 1987), within the context 
of this discussion, we argue that academic tracking inspires the development of different tools 
for inquiry—i.e., understandings of one’s and others’ intellectual capacities—that are then 
readily available when they make meaning about their own and others’ academic interests, 
intellectual talents, and future goals. Here we are implicating tools for inquiry in the 
psychologizing and rationalizing of social reproduction through routine school processes, which 
may manifest as ‘resistance.’  
The preceding discussion of how context influences the development and solidifying of our 
tools for inquiry is important to critical pedagogy because school practices like high stakes 
testing and academic tracking help create a background through which teachers and students 
develop responsive and useful tools for inquiry that help them make meaning within the 
institutionally specific demands of schooling. This can foster a general lack of appreciation for 
how concepts function as tools in problem solving in a wide variety of domains including the 
personal and the academic, helping identities “thicken” over time, with real implications 
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(Wortham 2005). Mostly such tools for inquiry lie “below the level of reflection” (Dewey 1980). 
In this context, student resistance to critical pedagogy may be in part predicated on their lack of 
experience with recognizing and consciously experimenting with how tools for inquiry guide our 
meaning making in a wide variety of contexts. Dewey emphasizes that doubting one’s 
conceptual tools may be emotionally and intellectually challenging, even when done apart from 
loaded topics like those associated with critical pedagogy: “It is dangerous to reflect seriously 
upon the nature, origin, and consequences of beliefs. The latter are safest when taken for granted 
without reasoned examination. To give reasons, even justifying ones, is to start a train of 
thoughts – that is, of questionings” (Dewey 1985, 19). In addition, taking context seriously 
requires epistemological analyses about the origins and nature of different beliefs, meanings, and 
concepts. This is complex work that takes time and energy, and at present it seems remote from 
the priorities given to schools. Regardless, individuals go on living and making decisions in a 
complex world despite the fallibility of the reasoning tools at hand. One implication of this 
argument is that critical pedagogues should not only focus on the content of issues like race and 
gender, but also upon the general academic context in which critical pedagogy is situated. 
Critical pedagogy can benefit from giving increased attention to the way tools for inquiry 
function more generally in schools. By also focusing on the ways tools for inquiry guide thinking 
within academic disciplines, it may become possible to help students develop the 
epistemological dexterity needed to explore how social justice works in contexts that are less 
personally threatening and emotionally demanding.  
The Tools for inquiry in the General Curriculum 
We have highlighted Dewey’s notion of tools for inquiry and have argued for its 
epistemological importance in social justice education. We have also argued that tools for 
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inquiry are shaped by, and shape, the contexts in which problems are solved, often with real 
implications for individuals and groups. In this section, we turn to a practical consequence of our 
argument, suggesting that we can fruitfully begin to get the “train of thoughts” moving, as 
Dewey might say, by helping students understand how conceptual tools influence the ways they 
make meaning in non-social justice topics found within the general curriculum. Doing so may 
mitigate the ‘resistance’ that surrounds beliefs about aspects of students’ lives like those 
associated with gender, which can be felt as highly personal. We cite research illustrating how 
students can actively explore tools for inquiry within content areas in ways that can extend to 
support social justice aims (discussed in the final section). Examining how tools for inquiry 
guide thinking within a subject matter area may be productive because students may not have 
had the opportunities to use the tools being explored to solve problems and make meaning in 
their personal lives, and they rarely would be personally incriminated by them. As such, the tools 
are—psychologically at least—less solidified and already tentatively held. To use Dewey’s 
language, they are at the level of beliefs, not concepts.  
The current science education literature is replete with discussions of the benefits of and 
techniques for helping students approach scientific inquiry as if they were apprentice scientists. 
Many educators now seek to help students engage in “authentic” scientific inquiry projects, 
rather than presenting them with uncontested scientific “facts” for memorization. Such 
experiences foster the conditions in which students conduct developmentally appropriate yet 
relatively sophisticated scientific inquiry – including the development of hypotheses, 
experimental design, and data analysis (Rudolph 2000).
  
These approaches contrast with staged 
experiments in which teachers arrange inquiry topics, hypotheses and experimental designs for 
their students. The latter represents a more conventional approach to the study of science in 
which students seek to “discover” pre-established answers and are at least partially (and 
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sometimes wholly) graded on whether or not they “got it right” (Trumbull, Bonney, and 
Grudens-Schuck 2005). Trumbull and colleagues criticize the latter approach, which they call 
“confirmatory” experiments, because it fails to help students explore how our tools for inquiry 
function in meaning making: 
Schools continue to emphasize confirmatory exercises that require students to 
follow explicit procedures to arrive at expected conclusions. …Students thus are 
rewarded for following directions and for obtaining predetermined correct 
answers. Consequently, students fail to learn habits necessary for conducting 
scientific inquiry, such as observing carefully, using theory and observations to 
formulate hypotheses, designing ways to investigate hypotheses systematically, 
analyzing and interpreting data, or other aspects of investigations. (Trumbull, 
Bonney, and Grudens-Schuck 2005, 880) 
 
Such approaches to teaching science not only do harm to the scientific enterprise—teaching 
students how to do school rather than to engage with science (Lemke 1982)—they ask students 
to accept tools for inquiry as already solidified, as answering questions without providing them 
with opportunities to explore how they function as meaning making tools. Echoing Dewey, 
Sandoval (2005) argues that if students do not have to decide what kind of data to get, they are 
unlikely to engage in epistemological considerations of what kind of data would be appropriate. 
If they are not responsible for coordinating data with particular claims, they are unlikely to 
consider the bases upon which particular claims might be warranted. In Kuhnian terms, students 
(and perhaps teachers) are taught to be unaware of the paradigms in which they work (Kuhn 
1996). Chinn and Malhotra argue that, as a result, “students are likely to fail to learn the 
heuristics scientists use to reason under uncertainty” (2002, 213).
  
They conclude that “there has 
been little development of inquiry tasks that enable students to learn how to reason about 
methodological flaws or how to coordinate theories with multiple studies that may conflict with 
each other” (2002, 213). One caveat: it is not that guided discovery is never appropriate, for even 
teachers who engage in “authentic” approaches to the study of science may have to supplement 
open-ended inquiry with highly structured experiences to help students develop the skills 
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necessary for reasoning autonomously. The matter is one of emphasis, and does not preclude the 
judicious use of guided instruction. 
Stewart and Rudolph (2001) provide an example of how high school science teachers can 
engage students in an examination of how tools for inquiry influence knowledge claims within 
the context of the general science curriculum. They describe a high school evolutionary biology 
curriculum designed to challenge students to explore how researchers’ “fundamental 
assumptions about the natural world” (Stewart and Rudolph 2001, 220) influence their 
interpretation of data. To do so, students were introduced to three divergent conceptual 
frameworks to explain evolution, two from within a traditionally acceptable tradition; Darwin’s 
natural selection model, and Lamarck’s “model of use inheritance;” (Stewart and Rudolph 2001, 
218) (2001, 218)with the third from Paley’s intelligent design theory.
 
Students were given access 
to data sets and asked to use the different conceptual frameworks to “develop explanations for a 
particular phenomenon, such as the shape of the carapace in Galapagos tortoises or the seed coat 
texture and thickness in a hypothetical species of plant” (Stewart and Rudolph 2001, 218). (2001, 
218)The focus of the unit was not the transmission of information – but rather to help students 
analyze data through the three conceptual frameworks to help them explore how each influences 
scientific meaning making.  
The researchers reported that students developed explanations for the evolutionary process 
based on the different resources of the three different models provided, achieving relatively 
sophisticated understandings of the ways that the three theoretical frameworks influenced their 
data interpretation. Because this example contributes to the development of the type of 
epistemological dexterity we are advocating here, the researchers’ discussion is worth quoting at 
length: 
Key to this section of the course is student exploration of the disciplinary context 
of each of these three models, focusing specifically on the fundamental 
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assumptions about the natural world on which the various models are based. 
Darwin’s model, for example, posited the existence of species capable of 
transformation by means of naturalistic forces continuously acting in the world. 
Paley, on the other hand, assumed the fixity of all species and required the action 
of metaphysical forces for the initial generation of species. Our goal here was not 
to lay out in detail the disciplinary structure of each of these models, but rather to 
simply illustrate the emphasis of this curriculum on the conceptual structure of 
models dealing with species of diversity. Once students understood both the 
general conceptual structure of these evolutionary models (that they were 
developed to account for a particular set of data and depended upon a given array 
of methodological and metaphysical assumptions) and the specific mechanisms of 
each, they were prepared to engage each other in debate over the relative 
adequacy of the models in addressing various empirical problems subsequently 
presented in class. What emerged in class discussions was a dialogue about the 
proper and improper use and evaluation of the competing models. (Stewart and 
Rudolph 2001, 220) 
 
In conclusion, Stewart and Rudolph observe:  
Given the assumptions of any one of the three models, students found that the 
related model was often perfectly adequate for solving a variety of…problems. 
(Paley’s intelligent design model is a particularly good example of a model with 
such broad explanatory power.) After recognizing the validity of each model in its 
own context, the comparative adequacy of the assumptions associated with the 
various worldviews rapidly became an issue. (p. 220) 
 
Stewart and Rudolph’s example directly addresses how knowledge emerges from within the use 
of specific conceptual tools for inquiry. The teachers created valuable opportunities for students 
not only to use the different conceptual frames as tools for further inquiry, but also to reflect 
upon the socio-historical contexts that gave rise to each of the three frameworks they employed. 
The teachers helped their students contextualize knowledge as emerging from specific inquiry 
processes, and, it is important to emphasize here, to engage in critical analysis of those 
frameworks and their influence on further knowledge construction. It provides one model for the 
approach we are arguing for, which is raising conscious awareness of tools for inquiry as a 
general method for developing an epistemological dexterity to support the aims of critical 
pedagogy. 
Page 20 of 28






























































For Peer Review Only
Deweyan Tools for inquiry 21 
Integrating Social justice education and General Curriculum through the Tools for inquiry 
In this final section, we move from the general curriculum to topics associated with social 
justice education like racism and sexism. Similar to Sandra Harding’s (1991, 1993) notion of 
“strong objectivity,” we argue that attending to social justice concerns – specifically issues 
related to how power and social oppression influences discipline-specific inquiry – enhances the 
disciplinary study regardless of whether or not it furthers social justice aims. But given the frame 
of tools for inquiry, we suggest that doing so can help advance the more specific, justice-oriented 
aims of social justice education by helping students analyze how the justice-related social 
context influences how we make meaning. For the sake of continuity, we again situate examples 
within science education, but now focus on ones that overlap with justice concerns.  
Feminists in particular offer important critiques of how issues of social justice corrupt 
scientific inquiry tools. Helen Longino (1990) argues that sexism influences the norms driving 
research; masculine-defined priorities are given more support, and they produce answers that 
privilege patriarchal gender relations and obscure oppression. Eisenhart and Finkel (1998) argue 
that women’s underrepresentation in science fosters a masculinist bias in the sorts of questions 
asked in research projects. (1998)For example, they argue that, “problems associated with 
conceiving a child have, until very recently, received little attention. The focus of work 
(generally by male researchers) has been on contraceptive techniques and devices to be used by 
women to prevent contraception”(Eisenhart and Finkel 1998, 26). One can conceive of such 
biases as consisting of tools for inquiry acting in collusion with the distribution of resources and 
the gendered composition of research teams to set the parameters for what is most valuable to 
know and to learn. 
A classic, albeit radical example of this critique is clear in how early male scientists 
interpreted analyses of semen through microscopes as miniature men (with arms and legs): 
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“Their observations were framed not by what they saw through their microscopes, but by what 
they expected to see based on Aristotle’s 2,000-year-old idea that women are passive incubators 
in conception” (Kleinman 1998, 843). While such an example may seem absurd today, the 
influences may subtly remain. For example, the remnants of patriarchy emerge clearly in Evelyn 
Fox Keller’s (1997) historical account of developmental biology. Keller describes a relatively 
recent “paradigm shift” in embryonic research in developmental biology due to the abandonment 
of the sexist metaphors that guided research since the 1920s. She argues that the metaphors 
prevented researchers from inquiring into embryos in important and alternative ways. The 
previously dominant discourse was of “gene action,” a way to understand the embryonic cell’s 
gene as the driving force in the cell (the masculine part of the cell) while the protoplasm was 
conceived as feminine. The protoplasm was considered to be passive and relatively unimportant, 
thus not worth researching: 
By the discourse of gene action, I mean a way of talking about the role of genes in 
development, introduced in the 1920s and 1930s by the first generation of 
geneticists, that attributes to the gene a kind of omnipotence – not only causal 
primacy, but autonomy and, perhaps especially, agency. Development is 
controlled by the action of genes. Everything else in the cell is mere surplus. 
…This way of talking not only enabled geneticists to get on with their work 
without worrying about what they did not know; it framed their questions and 
guided their choices, both of experiments worth doing and of organisms worth 
studying. (Keller 1997, 22)  
 
For the next forty years, Keller argues, embryonic research was guided and inhibited by this 
masculinist conceptual tool. Today, researchers have reconceived the relationship between 
cytoplasm and genes and argue that the cytoplasm plays a critical role in the “structure of the egg 
prior to fertilization, is widely regarded as pivotal in the recent renaissance of developmental 
biology. But it did not depend on new techniques” (Keller 1997, 21). Scientists forty years ago 
could have used existing technology to advance their research had they adopted a different 
conceptual framework. Thus, the example demonstrates how tools for inquiry influence the 
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knowledge claims one might make about a subject; in this case, it took feminist scientists to 
rethink the fundamental metaphorical grounding of a field of inquiry to make progress toward 
understanding embryo development in productive ways.  Keller’s (1997) example highlights the 
importance of attending to the tools for inquiry –  in her case the metaphorical framework 
scientists use to make sense of embryos – because they influence the questions scientists ask 
about embryos as well as their interpretations of the data they collect in their research projects.  
Furthermore, her example also exemplifies Dewey’s argument that rethinking a tool of inquiry 
can be difficult because it remains in the background as something that is perceived to be stable. 
In this case, the background tools still guided inquiry even when they failed adequately to 
resolve the scientific questions raised by the research community. 
School science and epistemological dexterity. Feminists’ arguments about the influence of 
gender beliefs on inquiry have led to calls for teachers in schools to help students analyze 
knowledge claims in more sophisticated ways that parallel the arguments we are making here 
with regard to the tools for inquiry. For instance, Maralee Mayberry recommends that educators 
should  
demonstrate early on that the facts and concepts they are presented with are 
relative to a certain system of thought or worldview. That will empower students 
to gain an understanding of how all knowledge is constructed within a social 
context. Even the seemingly benign fields of math and physics can be understood 
and taught as contextualized disciplines. (Mayberry 1998, 452) 
 
Elaine Howes (1998) provides a specific example of such epistemological study. 
 
Howes 
describes a sophomore-level high school biology unit in which students work in groups to study 
prenatal testing and then present their findings in role-plays. She asks students to consider  
Why is the doctor recommending this test? During what time period in the 
pregnancy is this test used? What, specifically, do geneticists and doctors use this 
test to find out? What are the possible dangers of this test? Would you choose (or 
Page 23 of 28






























































For Peer Review Only
Deweyan Tools for inquiry 24 
encourage your wife to choose) to have such a test?
6
 Do you think that women 
should be required to have such tests? (Howes 1998, 882)  
 
During the process of their personalizing the issues associated with the various prenatal 
testing choices facing them, students took on different perspectives – from those of doctors and 
nurses, to those of the pregnant women and other family members. As a result, students explored 
how one’s social position influenced what sorts of questions one might ask about the tests as well 
as what criteria were most important in making decisions about their role within pregnancy. For 
example, students concluded that much of the science literature focuses on the fetus and gives 
very little attention to the needs and concerns of the mother (Howes 1998), a power-related 
dynamic that has important implications for understanding the relationship between scientific 
and social practices in prenatal testing. 
Howes (1998) argues that students’ scientific inquiry processes were linked to their 
individual perspectives and the resources they drew on to guide inquiry. She demanded that 
students focus their study on pregnant women in ways that were previously not encouraged by 
the tone and scope of the scientific literature the students were consulting. Unlike the example 
regarding evolutionary biology we discussed earlier, this example has the potential to personalize 
the inquiry to an even greater degree while still helping students explore how their meaning 
making tools influence what they come to know. Because of the personal nature of Howes’ unit, 
the related gender dynamics became part of students’ conceptual toolset for understanding 
prenatal issues, providing an example of how social justice concerns can be mobilized as part of 




                                                 
6 
Howes regrets her framing of the relationships in the unit within the limited bounds of 
heterosexual marriages, arguing she should have adopted more inclusive terms. 
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Conclusion 
 
We began this discussion with the story of Charles Darwin finding a tropical shell in a 
surprising location. The tale is one where the background beliefs of scientific inquiry justifiably 
helped Darwin’s teacher and more experienced geologist reject the find as evidence of a new 
way of interpreting geological history. We return to it to emphasize that while the ensuing 
discussion has focused on the ways tools for inquiry can lead one to make unwarranted 
assertions about the world, especially the social world of the school, such thinking tools are 
nonetheless essential for inquiry of any sort to proceed. As we also argued at the opening, one of 
the essential goals of classroom inquiry guided by social justice education is to help students 
explore how power relationships associated with specific topics of social justice like race, 
gender, social class, and sexuality influence how they understand themselves and their social 
worlds.  Such work is personal—and personally implicating—and as thinking resources become 
more solidified with use, asking students to question what have been successful tools for making 
meaning may be a threatening and disorienting process in itself even without the more difficult 
emotional challenges associated with interrogating aspects of one’s own identity like gender or 
race.  
The analysis also supports and adds a crucial dimension to Applebaum’s thesis that 
resistance to social justice education consists of at least two mutually reinforcing dynamics: 
students’ refusal to think with new conceptual resources and their persistent use of ones that 
support oppression. We argue that we can help students prepare for thinking with the 
emotionally-charged conceptual resources offered in social justice education by helping students 
gain experience and comfort with epistemological analysis by emphasizing tools for inquiry, 
including within the context of specific general curriculum disciplines. Doing so may minimize 
the emotional attachment that surrounds social justice beliefs that students actively use. (We 
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emphasize that we are not trying to ‘soften the blow’ to individuals who suddenly come to terms 
with oppression—rather, we are proposing a kind of developmental approach to delivering it.) It 
is important to emphasize that when critical educators ask students to think about a topic like 
gender, they do so amidst an established context in which students are actively making meaning 
about the very object of inquiry they are offering. Unlike the study of race or gender, engaging in 
an analysis of how a conceptual resource guides meaning making within another area of 
academic inquiry may be more developmentally appropriate. The topic explored may be 
removed enough from their immediate social experiences that they do not bring solidified and 
immediately used tools for inquiry into the classroom experience. As a result, students may be 
able to develop more epistemological dexterity, the ability to explore and understand how their 
tools for inquiry help them make meaning and to resolve questions within the context of general 
academic study. In this way, the general curriculum can support the sort of epistemological 
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